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Capitalist Threads: Engels the Businessman and Marx’s 
Capital 
 
Introduction 
“For the last time,” with a shout of triumph and relief, Friedrich Engels left home 
for his final day at the firm of Ermen & Engels. Visiting Manchester, Eleanor Marx, 
the youngest daughter of Karl Marx, recorded his joyous return, crossing a field 
while “swinging his stick in the air and singing, his face beaming" (Kapp 1972, 
112). It was late June of 1869; Engels was 48 years old. Eleanor Marx’s 
witnessing of Engels’s release from the bond of commerce appears in all of his 
biographies. The message of the anecdote is that Engels’ joy that day was a 
measure of the agony he endured during his career as manufacturer. Evidently, 
his calling was elsewhere. Engels found happiness when he wrote on military 
history and strategy and pursued the cause of socialism and revolution. The most 
recent biography insists that he took greater delight from chasing foxes than 
from chasing profits (Hunt 2010).  
Between 1850 and 1870, Engels led a double life. In his two decades in 
Manchester Engels held two addresses, one official to meet business partners 
and his family, the other where he lived with the Burns sisters (Mary and 
Elisabeth) and kept company with exiled revolutionaries, hosting Marx on his 
occasional visits (Whitfield 1988, 7).1 Scholarship has been drawn to the radical 
side of this double life. Part of the explanation for this attention is lack of 
evidence. Writing in the early 1930s, Engels’s first and foremost biographer, 
Gustav Mayer, observed that there was "no exact information on [his] 
                                                        
1 Whitfiled (1988, 38) lists three official addresses at Great Ducie St., Thorncliffe Grove and Dover 
Street, and possibly seven other unofficial addresses. 
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commercial duties” to Ermen & Engels" (Mayer 1936, 46). Since Mayer’s there 
have been numerous other biographies, a complete set of correspondence and 
personal papers of Marx and Engels is undergoing publication as the Marx-Engels 
Gesamtausgabe (MEGA) and Wuppertal historians, in particular Michael 
Knieriem, have revealed the business history of the Engels family. On the basis of 
this evidence we are now much better sourced to reconstruct Engels’s business 
life.  
In this essay, we begin by reviewing the company history of Ermen & 
Engels and the status of Manchester as the hub of the cotton industry in the mid-
19th century. We argue that Engels was a merchant and an intelligencer. 
Although Engels had knowledge of all aspects of cotton spinning, his primary 
charge was to liaise with customers and suppliers, hence he had a detailed 
understanding of products and a vantage point upon the movements of goods, 
orders and prices.  
We claim Engels’s unhappy Manchester years left an imprint on the 
development of Marxist political economy. We argue that his insight into the 
most capital-intensive global commodity of the 1850s and 1860s, sold in world 
markets and sourced from raw materials from the New World and India, shaped 
key ideas and themes of Karl Marx’s Capital Volumes I and II. The statistical 
insights Engels gleaned from his perch in Manchester became prominent 
illustrations of advanced industry in Capital. But Marx did not only call upon 
Engels to exemplify an independently developed theoretical point. On matters 
such as machinery depreciation and reinvestment, Marx could not rely on theory 
alone and sought out Engels’ business acumen for guidance.  
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Alongside our examination of the substantive contributions by Engels to 
the writing of Capital, we also remark upon thematic overlaps between the 
library toil of London and the warehouse labors of Manchester. In prying into the 
structures of industrial capitalism, Marx’s intellectual project was to rid political 
economy from the self-serving ideology of the bourgeoisie and rebuild it from 
more robust foundations. Thus Marx often took as his point of departure the 
views and beliefs of capitalists and their economists and he adopted core beliefs 
of Manchester as essential features of industrial capitalism. First among these 
was a conception of capitalism as a unified world market, and related to this 
conception that it was under a constant threat of overproduction and would 
bring with it collapse if the pace of production was interrupted. These elements 
were uncontroversial in Engels’ experience of Manchester and of Ermen & 
Engels and a fundamental element of his legacy in political economy. 
 
Family Partnerships and Business Intelligence  
Manchester had grown spectacularly in the 1820s and 1830s as the commercial 
center of Lancashire, and by the time Engels arrived, the city had already 
supplanted London as financial center for the cotton industry. 2 The town was “a 
magnet for those wishing to decipher the meaning of industrialization” who 
could observe “its stark contrasts of misery and Midas-like riches” (Hunt 2010, 
79). Manchester was an icon, earning the sobriquet of “cottonopolis.”  
Engels lived in Manchester from 1842 to 1844. His first stint at Ermen & 
Engels was, as his father saw it, part of his practical instruction in commerce 
(Knieriem 1980). What Engels committed to paper from that visit was not the 
                                                        
2 Engels’s first visit to Manchester was actually in 1838, aged 18, accompanying his father.  
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portrait of affluence but a compelling indictment of its counterpart. Engels’s 
remarkable text, Condition of the English Working Class, has fascinated scholars 
and activists since its publication. We have several accounts that use the 
Condition to reconstruct the lived experience and the intellectual outlook of the 
young Engels. However, these accounts do not help us to follow Engels beyond 
1844 and shed no light on his activities in the 1850s and 1860s.  To appreciate 
the character of Engels’ affairs and his knowledge of business we first turn to a 
history of the firm Ermen & Engels and describe the Manchester of the panic of 
1857 and of the “cotton famine”.  
Throughout the nineteenth century, the cotton industry in Britain as in 
Germany was characterized by private partnerships reliant on family networks. 
Located in the regions of Lancashire and the Rhineland, the starting capital for 
modern industry came from a cluster of families already proficient in textile 
manufacture (Rose 2000, Kisch 1959). Ermen & Engels exemplified this pattern. 
The Engels clan had produced textiles for more than a century before Ermen & 
Engels was founded. The first enterprise, named Caspar Engels Söhne was 
created in 1747 in Barmen (Barmen together with Elberfeld now form the city of 
Wuppertal). At the start of the 19th century, the Engels family owned 80 of the 
179 mills in the city. In the 1830s the firm was jointly managed by three brothers, 
Caspar III, August, and Friedrich’s father, also called Friedrich. It is around this 
time that Friedrich senior becomes acquainted with Peter Ermen.3 Peter with his 
brothers Godfrey and Anton had a firm named Ermen Brothers, consisting of a 
couple of small spinning mills near Salford, in the outskirts of Manchester. Peter 
                                                        
3 Peter was born in Holland in 1802 and moved with his family to Hachenburg in Germany as a 
child. In 1820 he emigrated to England and was employed as a foreign agent for a yarn trading 
company, “Sheldon & Co.” of Manchester. Six years later he set up his own mill. 
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and Friedrich meet in 1832 when the latter visited England and they began 
planning for a new business venture. Friedrich senior withdrew from the family 
firm in May 1837 and joined in partnership with Peter creating Ermen & Co, 
renaming it Ermen & Engels the following year (in fact these were two legally 
distinct but identically named firms in England and in Prussia) (Knieriem 1986). 
Pooling their capital, they built Victoria Mill, in Eccles, six miles from 
Manchester; and another mill in Barmen, eventually adding mills in 
Engelskirchen, and Salford (Henderson 1971).  
The pooling of capital and the twin traditions in textile manufacturing 
may suggest that England and Germany were much alike but it was far from it. 
The crux of the deal was that Germany supply some of the finance and England 
supplied the know-how, access to raw materials and equipment. In 1840, 
Friedrich Senior petitioned successfully the Prussian Finance Ministry to be 
exempt from duties in importing English machinery.  Thereafter, the Engels’s 
Rhineland mills became an “English operation” reliant on English machines and 
on a English scale (Illner 2011). The mills used a mode of production that was 
still unusual in Germany and was met with praise and criticism. In 1844, the firm 
was invited to a industry show in Berlin to showcase its operations. In 1852, it 
was reprimanded by the local government for the long work hours of its child 
employees (Knieriem 1986). 
The other crucial difference between the two branches of Ermen & Engels 
was that while Lancashire produced for a world market, the Rhineland mills 
labored to clothe Prussia under the shelter of tariffs. Lancashire with its 
commercial and financial hub at Manchester was a node in a vast imperial and 
commercial infrastructure exchanging goods, capital, people and information 
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that reached outward to Liverpool and London and beyond to shores all over the 
globe. The Rhineland lacked such reach but could partake in it through English 
partnership. Thus, Engels diurnal duties at Ermen & Engels consisted of closely 
watching world markets often reporting back his observations to father and 
brothers, and as we will show, that information was also a subject of his letters 
to Marx. 
Alongside these asymmetries, Manchester was cause for a different sort of 
worry. Engels senior was concerned about the return to his investment. When 
the Engelskirchen mill opened, Anton Ermen moved to Germany to safeguard the 
interests of his family. But in England there was no agent of the Engels family. 
The fact that the Manchester offices of Ermen Brothers and Ermen & Engels 
overlapped in personnel and location augmented the suspicions of Friedrich 
senior. He believed that the Ermens were diverting his capital to the benefit of 
the firm Ermen Brothers. 
The breakdown of trust between the partners sealed Friedrich Junior’s 
return to business. In 1849, he was seeking reconciliation with his family. After 
some notorious activity in the revolutionary stirrings of the year before, he was 
forced to flee Prussia fearing imprisonment. Propitiously for Engels, his father 
believed that a feud between Peter and Godfrey Ermen treated the profitability 
of the firm and that the Ermens were misappropriating funds. In 1850, Engels 
joined the English firm as a clerk to represent his father’s interests, and drawing 
a salary from Germany.  For two years he kept watch on the commercial dealings 
of the Ermen brothers. Engels’s father may have doubted his son’s political 
reasonableness and his piety, but he trusted him to be his Manchester 
intelligencer. Engels gloated to Marx: “[M]y old man is enchanted with my 
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business letters and he regards my remaining here as a great sacrifice on my 
part."4  Contrary to this belief that he had fooled his father, Friedrich senior had 
set his son on this course as early as 1837. The year Ermen & Engels was formed 
was also the year he took his first born out of the Gymnasium and imposed on 
him an apprenticeship in international commerce. 
Engels examined the company books at the office during “dinner hours” 
so he would not be discovered.5 A month after he started, he reported to Marx 
that “little remains save the very involved task of comparing the prices at which 
Ermen Bros have been selling to us with the current prices on each occasion.” A 
few days after he wrote this, he sent his father the complete accounts of Ermen 
Bros for 1849/50, so that “he may see how these gentlemen carry on business 
with his capital.”6 For years he continued to report to his father on the profit loss 
of the business with great minutia.7 On one such occasion in 1860, Gottfried 
Ermen found out that Engels took the books home and was incensed.8 The 
secrecy and protectiveness of the accounts in 1850 as in 1860 suggests that 
business was opaque even for the inner circle of partners and clerks. Distrust 
was rife about discriminatory pricing, and about misuse of funds.  
The period of fraternal dispute ended in 1852 when Engels’s father took 
Godfrey’s side and forced Peter into retirement. As part of their deal, the firm of 
Ermen Brothers was dissolved. To ensure he would remain in Manchester, 
Engels convinced his father to secure his employment as a "corresponding clerk 
                                                        
4 Friedrich Engels to Karl Marx , Marx and Engels Collected Works [henceforth MECW], v. 38, #147, 
February 26, 1851. 
5 Engels to Emil Blank, MECW, v. 38, #127, December 3, 1850. Engels also complained to Emil 
Blank that when Peter Ermen was around more, it was even more difficult to examine the books.  
6 Engels to Blank, MECW, v. 38, #127, December 3, 1850. 
7 We don’t have Engels’s letters to his father but the replies testify to the detail of the reports. 
Father and son drew yearly comparisons and puzzled over the accounts. See Friedrich Engels to 
Friedrich Engels, Marx-Engels-Gesamtausgabe [henceforthe MEGA], III/7, December 20, 1853. 
8 Engels to G. Ermen, MECW , v, 41, #56, April 19, 1860.  
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and general assistant" (Jenkins 1951, 10). Engels began to earn a secure income 
from the English firm, and no longer needed to argue with his father over his 
financial needs. His contract of 1852 stipulated that he "duly observe lawful 
directions of Godfrey Ermen .... Shall keep time and regular accounts... All 
payments, receipts, sales orders, transactions, matters and beings." Although 
Peter was the founder, Godfrey had become the dominant figure in the firm. In 
fact, the firm owed its best selling product: “Godfrey Ermen’s Patent diamond 
thread” to his invention of a device to clean thread. The firm’s office was at 7 
Southgate, Deansgate, which Engels described to his mother as a “gloomy room 
in the warehouse, looking out on to the courtyard of an ale-house.”9  The office 
and warehouse were several miles away from the mills,10 and this location is 
consistent with our claim that Engels’s responsibilities lay with the commercial 
affairs and bookkeeping of the firm. The surviving letters by Gottfried Ermen to 
Engels, written when Engels was travelling in Europe or convalescing from 
illness, fill in this picture. The letter’s recurring theme was concern over 
customers, both in a lack of new orders or in payments past due. One of Engels’s 
primary roles was to seek new orders and make sure they we paid on time.11  
In 1860 Ermen & Engels in England had an estimated 60,000 pounds in 
capital and 800 employees (Henderson 1971). The 1861 census records that 
                                                        
9 Friedrich Engels to Elisabeth Engels, MECW, v. 43, July 1, 1869. 
10 That Engels’ primary responsibility was with ordering and book keeping does not imply he 
was not knowledgeable of the operations and conditions in the Mills. Certainly in his first period 
at Manchester Engels visited Victoria Mills, the main site of Ermen & Engels business, and 
reported upon it vividly in his The Condition of the Working Class in England.  In a much 
reproduced passage we read that "in the throstle room of the mill at Manchester in which I was 
employed, I do not remember to have seen one single tall, well built girl; they were all short, 
dumpy and badly formed...". 
11 Gottfried Ermen to Friedrich Engels, MEGA III/8, October 25, 1857; Charles Roesgen 
to Friedrich Engels, MEGA III/8, October 27, 1857. The letters also make clear that all 
prices were set by the Ermen brothers, see Gottfried Ermen to Friedrich Engels, MEGA 
III/9, November 3, 1858.  
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Godfrey Engels employed 150 males and 525 females for spinning, 27 males and 
58 females for bleaching, and 28 males and 3 boys for dyeing (Whitfield 1988). 
Ermen & Engels was a medium sized firm in the context of Lancashire industry. 
It was among a select group specialized in spinning cotton thread for sewing and 
hosiery-knitting. This specialized branch of the industry did well in the 1850s 
and 1860s thanks to rising household demand for its products. 
The most notable institution of Manchester’s dominion over cotton 
commerce and the site Engels sought for deals and information was the 
Exchange. The Exchange was built in 1804 for convenience of merchants seeking 
shelter from the inclement weather, and willing to pay for better surroundings 
than taverns or coffeehouses. In 1841 it underwent a major extension and was 
completely rebuilt in 1867-1874 as Engels was retiring, at each rebuilding it 
gained in majesty and comfort. The Exchange was a private club with paid 
annual subscription and because it was a for profit institution promising an 
attractive dividend to its founders (5% to 7%), it had low barriers to entry. In 
1850 it had 2678 subscribers, by 1860 there were 4209, and by 1869 there were 
6521 members.  When Engels became member of the Exchange, in 1854, the 
Marxes rejoiced at the news as omen of growing power and riches.12 But by then 
the membership was no longer made up primarily of owners; numerous agents, 
salesmen and representatives, like himself, had joined in order to stay abreast of 
changes in the markets and use the Exchange to make deals. 
The Exchange was the clearing house of Manchester intelligence. One of 
its histories, in a self-promotional flight of fancy, claimed that on the Exchange 
“there was a more detailed knowledge of every corner of the earth than in any 
                                                        
12 Marx to Engels, MECW, v. 39, #241, September 2, 1854. 
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other room in the world. To sell a yard of calico in a small South American state 
you had to know (and understand) precisely the political and mercantile pulse of 
the place. To get this sort of information you depended on a string of intrepid 
foreign emissaries who would send word back to the Exchange”(Scott 1976, 26-
7). On Tuesdays during “High ‘Change,” its monumental hall would fill with 
thousands of gentlemen in hats pacing and whispering deals. Overlooking the 
assembly of dealers were the posted prices of cotton at the Liverpool brokerage. 
The Exchange also had an extensive library of newspapers and other trade 
information, and for a long time had a Post Office on site (Rose 2000)  
Although he “spoke contemptuously of hunting for customers on the 
‘confounded’ exchange” (Jenkins 1951, 10), Engels had a front row seat 
(although he likely had to stand, there was no seating in the hall) to watch the 
movement in moods, prices and volumes traded, and thus infer the state of the 
market and its prospects. The Exchange was a source of excitement and insight 
that animated some of his correspondence with Marx. One representative 
market report by Engels in 1858 read: “Business here is tremendously good; for 
the past 6 weeks the spinners have been making 1 d à 1 ¼ d more per pound on 
coarse and medium counts than for the past 3 years and—quite unprecedented 
this—the local market in yarn rose 1 d before the Liverpool chaps were able to 
get another ¼ d for cotton.”13 In his reports, Engels speculated about close and 
distant futures. The excerpted 1858 letter came after the severe crisis of 1857 
and Engels wondered if the spurt of prosperity was not giving encouragement to 
another bubble of overproduction. 
                                                        
13 Engels to Marx, MECW, v. 40, #184, October 7, 1858. 
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Engels’s commercial knowledge, his fluency in foreign languages, his ease 
in writing, his evident confidence with accounting, were assets for an agent in a 
firm with an international clientele. He worked exceptionally hard, occasionally 
remarking to Marx about periods of overwork. For example, writing that 
“Whenever I think I have caught up to some extent with my commercial rubbish, 
I discover a whole pile of unsuspected arrears, am overrun by chaps, have to 
reply to hundreds of business queries on behalf of my old man and pander to 
fresh whims of Mr. Gottr.’s.”14 Once when Engels was overworked and ill, Marx 
wrote him: “Surely it is not your ambition to go down to posterity as one who 
sacrificed himself on the altar of Ermen & Engels' office?”15  The demands of the 
job animated a deep antipathy towards the Ermen kin. Engels would write in 
anger that “good Gottfried is indeed a breech-wetter,”16 and another time 
referred to Peter Ermen as a “tree frog.” 17  Engels’ feelings are not surprising. He 
had reasons to doubt the brothers’ integrity, and in the early years the pair 
hounded and pestered him as an unwanted intruder.18 Significantly, as we will 
see below, despite Engels’ disdain towards the Ermens and his occupation, Marx 
had to rely on Engels and his co-workers to gather information for Capital. 
In spite of his persistent complaints, Engels took pride in his competent 
diligence. When in 1858 Marx urged him to skip work to finish a pamphlet, 
Engels elected to cut on sleep to write rather than to feign illness. His 
commitment to the toil of commerce was surely reinforced by the freedom he 
was able to buy Marx as his unfailing and unquestioning patron. A further 
                                                        
14 Engels to Marx, MECW, v. 40, #49, March 11, 1857. 
15 Marx to Engels MECW, v. 40, #79, July 14, 1857. 
16 Engels to Marx, MECW, v. 41, #247, September 9, 1862. Marx once called Gottfried a bootlicker, 
in Marx to Engels, MECW, v. 41, #176 June 19, 1861. 
17 Engels to Marx, MECW, v. 38, #192, July 30, 1851. 
18 Engels to Marx, MECW, v. 38, #128, December 17, 1850. 
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contributing factor was the affection he nurtured for his family, first of all for his 
mother with whom he maintained a lifelong devoted correspondence.  
The status of Engels within the firm changed as a result of his father’s 
sudden death in 1860. Engels’s siblings plotted successfully to exclude the eldest 
son from the bulk of the inheritance. Engels received 10,000 pounds from his 
father’s estate, while the brothers took control of the mills in Prussia.19 With his 
inheritance, Engels bought himself a partnership with Godfrey Ermen that 
preserved Ermen & Engels in name. The negotiations however were not 
amicable and Engels had a nervous breakdown as a result. He felt abandoned by 
his family and hostage to Godfrey’s hard bargaining. Eventually, one of his 
brothers travelled to Manchester to broker the deal with Godfrey.20 Even so, it 
took four years before Godfrey committed to paper what they had agreed, only 
on 30th June 1864, finally giving Engels the income security he desired.21   
When in 1860 the Anglo-German partnership ended, the Engelskirchen 
and Barmen mills remained with the Engels family.  Significantly, even though 
there was no formal relationship between the two families, they continued to 
trade and the information flow was uninterrupted with Friedrich writing 
occasional reports on the cotton market to his siblings and making enquiries on 
                                                        
19 The role played by the nuclear family in capitalism was a subject Engels revisited later in his 
life, in Origin of the Family, after coming across a set of ethnographic notebooks by Marx. Engels 
concluded that the family was indispensable for capitalism’s development as regulator of 
property relations. Engels was writing from personal experience.   
20 To outvote Engels, Godfrey re-introduced his brother Anton into the firm. Anton was however 
never more than a perfunctory figure, and most often less than, as he allegedly “turned the office 
into a pub.” Around this time, Godfrey also resurrected Ermen Brothers, placing his nephew 
Henry as manager of the Bridgewater Mill in Pendlebury. (Whitfield 1988).  
21 From 1852 when he became an employee of Ermen & Engels, Engels received £100 a year and 
5 per cent of the profits in the first four years, 7 1/2 per cent in the second four, and 10 per cent 
in the next four. When he became partner in 1864, the share of profits rose to 20 per cent. Upon 
retirement, Engels withdrew 7,500 pounds and a further 4,964 pounds 16s 4d from the company. 
(Mayer 1936, 136). 
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their behalf.22 As before, he acted as occasional purchasing agent and 
intelligencer for the family. He fielded questions about machinery sating his 
family’s eagerness to copy whatever the English were doing. In a letter to his 
brother Emil, Engels gave a detailed description of how the cotton machinery 
functioned so as to keep him abreast of any innovation. Engels was confident 
that his description should be enough for his brother to make improvements on 
his own. He explained that continuous improvement and tinkering was the norm 
at Ermen & Engels.23  
For Engels’s family Manchester was their road to riches, to him it was 
income security. They owed much to the town, its special mode of production 
and global reach.  Manchester was the model setter for the factory system, and 
all else that accompanied it.  As the center of their world, Manchester influenced 
Engels’ reading of the pulse of capitalism, how he monitored world markets and 
how he took note of its working class.  Perhaps unsurprisingly, in Marxist 
political economy Lancashire cotton became the icon for advanced industry.  
 
Cotton Industry Analyst: Engels as Marx’s Informant  
Engels provided Marx with an inimitable understanding of the cotton industry.  
None of Marx’s other correspondents wrote to him about the cotton industry 
with the sophistication and prudence of Engels. Marx recognized the importance 
                                                        
22 See for instance the letter by Hermann Engels to Friedrich Engels, MEGA III.12, January 3, 1863, 
when his brother asks him to make inquiries of a shipment of cotton ordered by the German firm.  
23 Engels’s brother wanted him to be a purchasing agent for machinery but Engels excused 
himself. Although Engels had a good grasp of pricing and had been kept informed of the family 
purchases, he was not directly involved in those deals. The best practice at Ermen & Engels was 
to attempt most improvements in house and only for major works to contract a machine builder. 
See Engels to Emil Engels, MECW, v. 40, #303, November 16, 1859.  Engels also provided 
information about the machinery to Herman Engels; see also v. 42, #291, Engels to Herman 
Engels, November 28, 1867. Similarly, he had also written reports of factory practices to his 
father, who in 1854, charged him to find out how Ermen & Engels printed their cards (that 
accompanied the thread), see Friedrich Engels to Friedrich Engels, MEGA III/7, May 16, 1854.   
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of Engels’s perspective, writing about the European wide convulsions in credit 
and goods makers, he noted that “your information about conditions in 
Manchester is of the greatest interest to me, the newspapers having chosen to 
draw a veil over them.”24  Interestingly, Engels would write Marx in detail about 
the cotton industry, and Marx would almost invariably say little or nothing in 
reply.  In the rare instances when they entered in discussion, Engels would 
better Marx showing his richer understanding. 
A dominant sentiment in Engels’s letters to Marx about cotton capitalism 
was anxiety. Engels’s letters conveyed that the first factor of uncertainty was the 
cotton crop, which was subject to the vicissitudes of weather and in this period 
to civil war blockade in America. Profitability occurred on a knife’s edge of 
panicky inventory management, volatile price changes, discretionary accounting, 
and family feud. A firm’s margins relied on its successful calculations and 
negotiations into an uncertain future and timely delivery to clients.  The greatest 
threat, as Engels saw it, was the uncontrolled power of production. Unchecked 
the cotton industry could bankrupt itself with overproduction. 
The letters exchanged between Engels and Marx provide the best way to 
grasp how Engels helped Marx grasp Manchester capitalism.  Engels often wrote 
Marx reports in the style of a modern day investment analyst. The following is 
representative: 
The minor panic in the money market appears to be over, consols and 
railway share are again rising merrily, money is easier, speculation is still 
pretty evenly distributed over corn, cotton, steam boats, mining 
operations, etc., etc. But cotton has already become a very risky 
proposition; despite what is so far a very promising crop, prices are rising 
continuously, merely as a result of high consumption and the possibility 
of a brief cotton shortage before fresh imports can arrive. Anyway I don't 
                                                        
24 Marx to Engels, MECW, v. 40, #111, December 8, 1857. 
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believe that the crisis will this time be preceded by a regular rage for 
speculation; if circumstances are favourable in other respects, a few mails 
bringing bad news from India, a panic:  in New York, etc., will very soon 
prove that many a virtuous citizen has been up to all kinds of sharp 
practice on the quiet. And these crucial ill-tidings from overstocked 
markets must surely come soon. Massive shipments continue to leave for 
China and India, and yet the advices are nothing out of the ordinary; 
indeed, Calcutta is decidedly overstocked, and here and there native 
dealers are going bankrupt. I don't believe that prosperity will continue 
beyond October or November—even Peter Ermen is becoming worried.25  
 
In the 1850s and 1860s Marx and Engels’ relationship depended greatly 
on their correspondence. Their labour was letter writing. Engels as a 
correspondent clerk was writing customers, suppliers and the german branch of 
the business. Marx as secretary of the Communist League, at the Workingmen’s 
Association, and in the various political exile committees, maintained and 
expanded epistolary networks.  The Royal Mail in England proved a boon during 
their exile, a letter posted in Manchester before 9 am would reach London on 
time for a response on the same day.  Because of this the two men could carry on 
an engaging conversation—Engels could share his frustrations about the Ermen 
brothers, and Marx could convey his financial distress and report on his ill health. 
When the occasion justified, Engels could provide Marx with daily reports on the 
cotton industry. Reviewing these letters we can appreciate how Engels to keep 
abreast of the cotton market drew from multifarious sources —including 
numerous newspapers, broker reports, conversations in the Exchange, and the 
views of his business partners.  
Marx’s knowledge of cotton and Manchester was obtained through the 
letter exchange with Engels. There is no evidence that Engels enabled Marx to 
visit the mills of Lancashire and the trading hubs of Manchester.  In the early 
                                                        
25 Engels to Marx, MECW, v . 39, #83, August 24, 1852. 
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years of their friendship and intellectual partnership, Engels and Marx travelled 
to Manchester and devoted that summer to reading and discussing political 
economy at the city’s library.  By contrast to the summer of 1845, Marx’s trips to 
Manchester in the 1850s and 1860s left few impressions on archival documents 
and memoirs. However, we do know that on several of these occasions, Marx was 
ailing from physical and mental exhaustion.  He joined Engels with the purpose 
of recovering his health with day-long horseback rides in the Lancashire 
countryside. Given Engels’s double living, it is unlikely that he would have shown 
Marx the business of Manchester; indeed there is no testimony of any such visits 
in Marx’s published notebooks, and their correspondence gives no indication of 
this either. When not ailing, in Manchester, like in London, Marx read. 26  
The correspondence shows that Engels claimed expertise on the core 
aspects of the cotton market and industry.  For example, in December 1868, 
Marx shared what he believed to be an astounding insight based on his reading 
of a report by Ellison and Haywood, Liverpool cotton brokers whose circulars on 
the supply of cotton were among the most reputable and found regular 
publication as a supplement to The Economist. The report noted that in 1862-4 
an enormous quantity of cotton was imported and stored in England. Marx 
observed that the large stock of cotton must have been vital to avoid the collapse 
of the cotton market during the American Civil War blockade (the (in)famous 
“cotton famine”). Marx read this not as a case of foresight, but as one of fantastic 
                                                        
26 Only a small part of Marx’s notebooks have been published, up to January 1855, but missing 
September 1851 to September 1853. Of the published notebooks nearly all comprise of excerpts 
from readings. But perhaps the most significant evidence that Marx was not drawn to make his 
own observations of mills is that he always referred back to the parliamentary Factory Reports 
for his graphic depiction of waged labor. On at least one of these trips, Marx participated in the 
intellectual life by sitting at the meetings of the Royal Institution and hearing discussions about 
the statistical description of the cotton markets. 
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luck, exclaiming: “What a fine crash that would have produced if the Civil War 
had not broken out!”27 The reasoning but most crucially the data, failed to 
impress Engels. He offered to provide Marx more thorough statistics from the 
Liverpool Broker Association, objecting “ that, to explain things rationally, you 
must include 1861, when the colossal 4 million crop of 1860 gradually arrived 
here. How Ellison & Haywood could omit this is incomprehensible to me, unless 
the people had a particular business purpose in their statistics.”28 Engels did not 
clarify what he meant by the “particular business purpose” of Ellison & Haywood 
whose business was to inform clients of the supply of cotton. Engels’s comments 
makes clear his self-confident understanding of the cotton market and thereby 
his ability to help Marx refine his understanding.   
 Engels’s correspondence to Marx about the cotton industry intensified 
during crisis.  With the onset of the 1857 crisis, Engels wrote Marx: “It's capital 
that you should be collecting material on this crisis. I am sending you another 2 
Guardians today. You shall have it regularly, and the Examiner and Times too now 
and again. I shall also advise you as frequently as possible of everything I learn 
so that we have a good stock of facts.”29  In November 1857, Engels provided 
Marx with a plethora of inside information.  He colorfully described the 
Exchange:   
The general appearance of the Exchange here was truly delightful last 
week. The fellows are utterly infuriated by my sudden and inexplicable 
onset of high spirits. Indeed, the Exchange is the one place where my 
current dullness is transformed into resilience and bouncing. On top of 
that my predictions are, of course, always gloomy, which makes the asses 
doubly furious. On Thursday the situation was at its most dismal, on 
Friday the gentlemen were mulling over the possible effects of the 
suspension of the Bank Act and, with cotton rising another 1d., word went 
                                                        
27 Marx to Engels. MECW, v.43, #125, December 9, and Marx to Engels, #128, December 12, 1868. 
28 Engels to Marx, MECW, v. 43, #131, December 13, 1868. 
29 Engels to Marx. MECW, v. 40, #106, November 15, 1857.  
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round that the worst was over. By yesterday, however, the most 
delectable despondency again prevailed; all the hosannas had been so 
much hot air and, since hardly anyone wanted to buy, the market here 
remained as bad as ever.30 
 
He delineated the effects on labor and captured the international scene: 
 
The extension and prolongation of the crisis are also assured. The 
combination of short time and the silk crisis, which latter has already 
deprived the vast mass of the silk (hand-loom) weavers of their livelihood, 
will of itself suffice to ruin the hometrade completely this winter—up till 
the end of October it was still doing well. The American crisis is playing 
havoc with the Barmen and Elberfeld smallware manufacturers, the 
Elberfeld, Krefeld and Lyons silk manufacturers and the German, French 
and Belgian cloth manufacturers. The smallware manufacturers of 
Barmen are suffering particularly also due to Bennoch and Twentyman, 
while Draper, Pietroni & Co. are causing difficulties in Italy, especially 
Milan, the Duchies, Bologna, etc.… Never before has any crisis exhausted 
itself so rapidly and abruptly, and this one, coming after 10 years of 
prosperity and speculation, is least apt to do so. Nor is there another 
Australia or California to come to the rescue, while China will be in the 
doldrums for the next 20 years.31 
 
Since understanding the crisis crucially depended upon appreciating the price 
fluctuations of cotton, Engels prepared a detailed chart on the price changes of 
Orleans Middling cotton, showing cotton had reached an unprecedented low a 
couple of days before he wrote Marx. Engels used official reports from an Ermen 
& Engels’s broker to create the chart.32 To Engels the ebb and flow of the markets 
had more than just office interest, it prefigured revolutionary opportunity. The 
conclusion of his market analysis to Marx was a call to arms, noting with 
emphasis that  
I must say I feel just as you do. When the bubble burst in New York I grew 
very restless in Jersey and in the midst of this general downbreak I fell 
tremendously cheerful. The bourgeois filth of the last seven years has 
undoubtedly clung to me to some extent; now it will be washed away and 
I shall become a changed man. Physically, the crisis will do me as much 
good as a bathe in the sea; I can sense it already. In 1848 we were saying: 
Now our time is coming, and so in a certain sense it was, but this time it is 
                                                        
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid 
32 Ibid. 
 20 
coming properly; now it's a case of do or die. This will at once give a more 
practical slant to my military studies. I shall apply myself without delay to 
the existing organisation and elementary tactics of the Prussian, Austrian, 
Bavarian  and French armies, and apart from that confine my activities to 
riding, i.e. fox-hunting, which is the best school of all.33  
 
For the remainder of 1857 and in January 1858, Engels kept Marx 
apprised of the developments of the crisis, feeding him detailed and confidental 
information.  For example, Engels informed Marx about houses endorsing bills, 
such as Schunck, Souchay & Co., and Engels emphasized: “If I give you the names 
of the houses concerned, it is on the understanding that this remains strictly 
between ourselves.  I could get into a devil of a row if such an abuse of 
confidential information were to come to light.”34 During the deluge of 
information he provided Marx, Engels was also steering his attention.  Engels 
emphasized the importance of overproduction during the crisis, and urged Marx 
to pay attention to “how overproduction is generated by the expansion of credit 
and by overtrading.”35  Engels also told Marx what information to squirrel away, 
notably to “make a note of the balance-sheets of the firms that have failed….  All 
of them most edifying.” 36 
 Marx exhorted Engels to keep the information coming,  to “[w] rite to me 
whenever you have the time, for later on you’re sure to forget all the ’chronique 
scandaleuse’ of the crisis which is so invaluable to us.  I make excepts from your 
letters and enter them in the principal record books.”37  Marx did save excerpts 
from Engels’s correspondence and used this information in Capital.  For example, 
he virtually copied one later epistolary report by Engels in Capital Volume I.  In 
                                                        
33 Ibid 
34 Engels to Marx, MECW, v. 40, #113, December 9, 1857. 
35 Engels to Marx, MECW, v. 40, #114, December 11, 1857. 
36 Engels to Marx, MECW, v. 40, #115, December 17, 1857. 
37 Marx to Engels, MECW, v. 40, #117, December 21, 1857. 
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January 1867, Engels provided Marx with information concerning a glut in the 
cloth market in England that led to selling vast amounts on consignment to India 
and China, and to renewed tensions in labour relations. The pressures to cut 
wages (in the long term interest of capitalists), ultimately resulted in an 
agreement between labor and capital for shorter work days.38  Marx, providing 
no credit to Engels, used this in Capital Volume I as firsthand documentation to 
bolster his contention that improvements in machinery adversely effected labor 
([1867] 1990, p. 561).  Notably, Marx often provided no citation information 
when he described or examined the cotton industry in Capital Volume I--thus, 
numerous examples and descriptions, and some of these from Engels, appear 
with no bibliographical information.39 
 During January 1858, Marx and Engels’s correspondence about the crisis 
came to an end.  Curious about the state of affairs at Manchester, Marx wrote: 
“How is business …?  Everything seems to be going better than expected.”40 
Engels replied with reports of fox hunting, and of the markets showing signs of 
improvement. Engels hopes of trading huckstering for militia strategy ended.  
After what became know as the crisis of 1857, Engels continued to apprise Marx 
of the tribulations of the cotton market, however, no other market convulsion 
carried the same prospect again. Engels never again wrote Marx letter after 
letter sanguinely charting  Manchester affairs and expectantly spying signs of the 
advent of proletarian revolution. 
                                                        
38 Engel to Marx, MECW, v. 42, #207, January 29, 1867.  
39 Engels’s firsthand business experience enabled him to provide editorial assistance to Marx for 
Capital Volume I.  For instance, he amended a footnote to a later edition of Capital Volume I that 
evinced his understanding of the history of the cotton industry (Marx [1867] 1990, 805, fn 35).  
Engels also added footnotes that required his business expertise.  For example, he clarified the 
distinction between “normal” and “commercial” horsepower ([1867] 1990, 511, fn 25). 
40 Marx to Engels, MECW, v. 40, #131, January 23, 1858. 
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 How Marx called upon the knowledge of his comrade in arms also 
changed.  After 1857, Marx turned to Engels for help to comprehend some of the 
bookkeeping practices of Ermen & Engels in order to better understand what he 
dubbed the cycle of industrial reproduction—that is the timing of when a bulk of 
the machinery in industry was replaced.  Marx took industrial reproduction as 
the key to understand crisis.  Marking the watershed in their epistolary exchange, 
Marx, as we will see in the section below, wrote Engels about depreciation 
calculations in early March 1858.  Marx had witnessed the end of an industrial 
cycle in 1857, and he turned to Engels for guidance to help develop his thinking 
about crisis for his great writing project, Capital.41 
  
Engels’s practical knowledge and Capital  
Over the years Marx sought Engels’s for his knowledge of business in practice. 
Marx queried know how of management and bookkeeping: how Ermen & Engels 
calculated depreciation; if the firm had an accumulation fund and if so what use 
it made of it.  In these letters, Marx appealed to Engels’ authority as an 
experienced capitalist.  For example, Marx wrote that “as a manufacturer, you 
must know what you do with the returns on capital fixe before the time it has to 
be replaced in natura.  And you must answer this point for me (without 
theorizing, in purely practical terms).”42  On another occasion, Marx said that 
“[s]ince practice is better than all theory, I would ask you to describe to me very 
precisely (with examples) how you run your business.”43  We note that Marx 
almost always queried Engels about the practices of capital, rarely about the 
                                                        
41 In Capital Volume I, Marx wrote: “It will be remembered that the year 1857 brought one of the 
gigantic crises with which the industrial cycle always terminates” ([1867] 1990, p. 822). 
42 Marx to Engels, MECW, v. 42, #243, August 24, 1867. 
43 Marx to Engels, MECW, v. 43, #110, November 14, 1868.  
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conditions and actions of labor.44  This is not surprising given the scope of 
Engels’s duties at Ermen & Engels.  
After the 1857 crisis, Marx began examining the connection between how 
often machinery was replaced and the length of the industrial cycle.45  Marx had 
studied Charles Babbage’s On the Economy of Machinery and Manufactures 
(1832), wherein Babbage maintained that it would take on average five years for 
machinery to wear out and require replacement. Babbage had visited factories to 
gather data to support his claim. Marx, however, suspected that five years was 
incorrect.  Knowing nothing in the British Museum to consult, he turned to 
Engels’s firsthand observations.  Engels responded with a lengthy and detailed 
letter,46 maintaining that Babbage’s “assertion is so absurd” and that there is “not 
a single establishment in England in the regular line of big industry which 
replaces its machinery in 5 years.”  According to Engels, “The most reliable 
criterion is the percentage by which a manufacturer writes down his machinery 
each year for wear and tear and repairs, thus recovering the entire cost of his 
machines within a given period.”  Engels said businesses normally used a 
depreciation rate of 7.5% per annum, and hence assumed the machinery would 
be paid for over 13 1/3 years by way of annual deductions from profits.  Engels 
provided Marx with an accounting rule, establishing how the value of machinery 
would wear out in the books.47  Engels also explained in his example balance 
sheet how the business would make account of expenditures on repairs. 
                                                        
44 There is only one letter where Marx asked Engels about the workers at Ermen & Engels (MECW, 
v. 41. .351).  Engels offered no written reply. 
45 Marx to Engels, MECW, v. 40, #147, March 2, 1858. 
46 Engels to Marx, MECW, v. 40, #148, March 4, 1858, pp. 279 – 282. 
47 In Capital Volume I, Marx’s use of the concept “depreciation” accorded with Engels’s business 
conception.  Marx maintained that the value the machine transfers to the product equals 
depreciation (p. 509).  Marx also maintained that machinery created no new value; it “never adds 
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The figure of 13 1/3 was an accounting convention, and Engels cautioned 
Marx that in reality business often proceeded quite differently, that “numerous 
bankruptcies and changes occur; you may enter other branches, sell your old 
machinery, introduce new improvements.”  Engels said the Ermen & Engels’s 
mill had 20 year-old machines still in operation, and some of “the more ancient 
and ramshackle concerns” contained parts at least 30 years old. The matter was 
further complicated because the durability of machines and the ease of replacing 
parts made it possible for legacy machinery to incorporate new innovations.  He 
reported that “over the last 20 years improvements in spinning machinery have 
not been such as to preclude the incorporation of almost all of them in the 
existing structure of the machines, since nearly all are minor innovations.” 
[emphasis by Engels] Despite the difficulties in tracing reproduction in kind (and 
recording the death and integrity of machines as material objects) Engels trusted 
the wisdom of business and that if his 13 1/3 “calculation wasn’t more or less 
right, practice would have changed it long ago.”  Engels closed his letter with a 
telling observation about obsolescence that: “Ten to twelve years are enough to 
bring about changes in the character of the bulk of machinery, thereby 
necessitating its replacement to a greater or lesser extent.”48 
Marx’s reliance on a 20 year old text by Babbage  suggests how difficult it 
was for him to peer into the opaque business practices of Manchester capitalism 
                                                                                                                                                              
more value than it loses, on average, by depreciation” (p. 509).  Marx’s position here followed the 
conventional business practice of his day.  
48 Engels’s letter posed a challenge to Marx.  Engels stated that Ermen & Engels had twenty year 
old machinery in operation, and Marx maintained that the cycle of industrial reproduction was 
far shorter than this.  Hence, Marx needed to address how to determine the value transferred 
from machines that operated for long periods of time.  To do so, Marx maintained that an 
operative machine’s exchange value depended upon the creation of new and improved 
machinery of less value, and that the value of an operative machine depended upon the labor 
time necessary to produce the superior machine ([1867] 1990, p. 528).  Marx dubbed the loss in 
value of the superior “moral depreciation.”    
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from the shelves of London libraries and hence Engels’s rich response was 
informative and authoritative.  In his reply, Marx stated  
My best thanks for your éclaircissements' about machinery. The figure of 
13 years corresponds closely enough to the theory, since it establishes a 
unit for one epoch of industrial reproduction which plus ou moins 
coincides with the period in which major crises recur; needless to say 
their course is also determined by factors of a quite different kind, 
depending on their period of reproduction. For me the important thing is 
to discover, in the immediate material postulates of big industry, one 
factor that determines cycles.49  
 
Marx’s reply reveals determining the periodicity of crises was paramount—
indeed his March 1858 letter came shortly after the late 1857 crisis. In Capital 
Volume II, Marx maintained that industry and industrial capital had a lifespan, 
and in accord with Engels’s letter, he asserted that innovations influenced this 
lifespan due to invention and competition—means of production had to be 
updated long before they were worn out.  Regarding the life cycle of industry, 
Marx agreed with Engels: “We can assume that, for the most important branches 
of large-scale industry, this life cycle is now on average a ten-year one” ([1885] 
1992, p. 264).50 Furthermore, Marx tellingly maintained that industrial capital 
provided the “material foundations” for the “periodic cycle” or crisis, and the 
crisis “is always the starting-point of a large volume of new investment.”  (Below 
we will show this crucially depends on the accumulation fund.)   
Alongside this conversation about the lifetime of machines, Engels was 
Marx’s source for data on depreciation calculations for use in Capital Volume I.51  
Apparently Marx could not find this information anywhere else. On p. 186 in the 
                                                        
49 Marx to Engels, MECW, v. 40, #149, March 5, 1858. 
50 Interestingly in Capital Volume III, Engels used the ten-year average (as Marx does on this page 
of Capital Volume II) for the crisis cycle.  See p. 633 (pdf version??????).  Marx also used the ten-
year figure in Capital Volume III; see for example pages: 280 and 345. 
51 Engels to Marx, MECW, v. 43, #17, May 10, 1868.  
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original German edition, Marx included a table based on data that Engels had 
given him culled from Ermen & Engels’s books.52  In 1868, when working on the 
second edition of Capital Volume I, Marx wrote again to Engels to obtain 
additional data to supplement the table.53  Subsequent editions of Capital include 
that information, presumably provided by Engels; see Marx ([1867] 1990, 327-
328).  Marx used the data to provide an example on how to calculate the rate of 
surplus value, that is the ratio of surplus labor to necessary labor.  The details in 
the example include: the price of cotton, cost per spindle, wage cost per spindle, 
wages, depreciation, price of yarn, and more.  He admitted in a footnote that the 
example in the first German edition contained some factual errors.  He said the 
updated example was “entirely accurate’” and credited a “Manchester 
manufacturer” ([1867] 1990, 328, fn 8). 
A few years after their correspondence on machinery Marx was again 
seeking Engels’s insight into business practice when he wrote asking about the 
existence of the accumulation fund and how it was used.54  Marx defined the 
accumulation fund as a fund of money dedicated to replacing worn out 
machinery.  Marx stated that the political economy literature, namely the 
Malthusians, acknowledged the existence of the accumulation fund, but provided 
no indication of its business use. Marx insisted that the response he sought from 
Engels was how the fund was used “in practice.”55  That Marx wrote to Engels on 
this subject in 1862 and in 1867 suggests how important he saw the 
accumulation fund for his analysis.  In 1862, Marx wanted to know if a business 
actually used an accumulation fund; he said that as a businessman, Engels “must 
                                                        
52 Marx to Engels. MECW, v. 43, #19, May 16, 1868. 
53 Marx to Engels., MECW, v. 43, #15, May 7, 1868. 
54 Marx to Engels, MECW, v. 42, #243, August 24, 1867 
55 ibid 
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have the answer.”56 Notably, Marx thought if businesses actually used an 
accumulation fund, this fact might help explain why in developed capitalist 
economies capital accumulated at different rates.  Engels wrote a short reply in 
1862, and said he was far too busy at Ermen & Engels to answer in full.57  He 
suggested, however, that Marx would benefit from his business expertise 
because he suspected Marx had missed or misunderstood something—Engels 
did not specify what.  
Engels’s response to Marx’s second attempt in 1867 was more 
forthcoming, although he did not answer at once, excusing himself to “ask some 
other manufacturers whether [Ermen & Engels] practice was the customary one 
or an exception.”58 The  response was detailed, with two long tables to illustrate 
the reasoning. It was an abstract example and not a rendition of actual 
experience. At the start of his letter, Engels reminded Marx of the 7.5% rate of 
depreciation that was best practice but instead used a 10% rate for ease of 
exposition. Engels then outlined two scenarios linked to his two schedules.  The 
first assumed that the manufacturer invested all the money he wrote off over the 
life of the machine into the money markets until the time it was needed to 
replace the equipment in full.  Engels showed that if a capitalist earned 5% 
annual interest on the 10% yearly write off of 1000 pounds of machinery, then 
he would end up with a little over 1250 pounds in “ready cash” at the end.  The 
second scenario, that reflected Ermen & Engels practice of continuous 
improvement in machinery, was more advantageous. The manager would 
purchase new machines each year in the value of the write off, on the first 
                                                        
56 Marx to Engels, MECW, v. 41, #243, August 21, 1862. 
57Engels to Marx, MECW, v. 41, #247, September 9, 1862.  
58 Engels to Marx, MECW, v.42, #244, August 26, 1867. 
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instance only as a portion of the 1000 pounds but later also on the reinvested 
stock.  Over the ten years of compounded renewal, the value of the machine 
stock at the start and the end would be the same 1000 pounds, but throughout 
the period the firm would have been working at higher capacity. Engels 
emphasized that “the money advanced for writing off has thus enable [the 
capitalist] to increase his machinery by 60% [over the ten years] and without 
putting a farthing of his actual profit into the new investment.”  In the example 
the capitalist had on average 45% increased capacity. 59  In sum, Engels 
demonstrated to Marx that the capitalist used the accumulation fund (what he 
called “renewal fund”) in two different ways: either as investment, thereby 
accruing interest and hence amassing wealth for later use, or as a means to 
continuously replenish and expand machinery, thereby immediately enabling 
increased production for the business. Marx seemed satisfied with the 
explanation of how the accumulation fund was used to expand business and 
replied with the shortest of thanks. 60   
 Marx wrote about the “accumulation fund” in Capital Volume II ([1885] 
1992, 158, 250-251).61  He first recapitulated his understanding of depreciation 
as stated in Capital Volume I: the portion of value of fixed capital that a machine 
transfers to the product equaled depreciation.  Then Marx maintained that some 
kinds of fixed capital, due to natural wear and tear, had to be replaced in part 
each year. His example was the railway industry where replacement 
approximately equaled the amount of depreciation each year.  However, in other 
industries, Marx maintained that the value of depreciation could be made into a 
                                                        
59 Engels to Marx, MECW, v.42, #245, August 27, 1867. 
60 Engels to Marx, MECW, v.42, #248, August 31, 1867. 
61 Note that Marx did not use the term “accumulation fund.”  He called it a “reserve fund.” 
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money fund. In the following, Marx echoed Engels and offered the striking 
implications of the accumulation fund: 
Even though, as we have seen, the fixed capital continues to function in its 
natural form in the production process, if a part of its value has circulated 
with the product, according to the average wear and tear, and been 
transformed into money, then is forms an element of the money reserve 
fund for the replacement of the capital when its reproduction in kind falls 
due.  This part of the fixed capital value transformed into money can 
therefore serve to expand the business or to effect improvements in the 
machines which increase their effectiveness.  …This reproduction on an 
expanded scale does not arise from accumulation—the transformation of 
surplus-value into capital—but from a retransformation of the value, 
which branches into two parts, and in its money form has separated itself 
off from the body of fixed capital, into new fixed capital of the same kind, 
either additional or more effective.  Of course it depends in part on the 
specific nature of the business how far and in what dimensions it is 
susceptible to a gradual addition of this kind (p. 251).     
 
Marx saw the potential in certain industries for expansion through the 
accumulation fund, and maintained that this expansion did not have to depend 
on profits.  Marx surely had Ermen & Engels in mind when he wrote this.  Thus 
Marx suggested that certain industries could weather crises better than others, 
and that at the end of the industrial reproduction cycle when a crisis ensued, 
certain industries would be better poised to expand.   
The attention given to the accumulation fund in Capital Volume II is 
significant.  One of the main points in Capital Volume I is that machinery 
gradually and eventually displaces workers; in chapter fifteen Marx showed this 
was the case historically.  In Capital Volume II, Marx suggested that as the use of 
the machinery grew, the industries that employed those machines could use the 
accumulation fund to increase the scale of industry.  And the larger the scale of 
machine-based industry, the greater the potential of the accumulation fund to 
further increase the scale.  Thus the accumulation fund proved crucial to the 
 30 
industrial reproduction cycle, and would have provided the capitalist with the 
means to invest post-crisis.   
 There is no evidence that Engels criticized Marx’s understanding of the 
depreciation of machinery and the accumulation fund expressed in Capital. As 
reviewer and copy editor of volume I, and as editor of volume II - a five-hundred 
page manuscript found in 1883 - Engels had ample opportunity to align Marx’s 
writing with his own understanding of business calculations and practices.62 
Engels corrected Marx in only one instance, taking great pains to substantially 
revise chapter fifteen, “The Effect of Circulation Time on the Magnitude of 
Advanced Capital” of Capital volume II. In his assessment Marx had made 
multifarious mistakes in computing turnover calculations for the circulation of 
capital.  He excused Marx for not being a man of “practical calculations.”63 
despite his “firm grasp of algebra, he was never at ease in reckoning figures, i.e., 
commercial calculations.” Marx worked through volumes of examples, but 
“knowledge of the proper rules of calculation is not at all the same thing as 
exercise in the everyday practical calculations of the trader.” ([1885] 1992, p. 
359). However much he practiced at his London desk, Marx could not make 
himself into a Manchester clerk. Engels remained indispensable and 
irreplaceable as Marx’s correspondent in the heart of capitalism. It was in 
epistolary conversation that Marx gained insight into the formulas of 
depreciation and the uses of the accumulation fund, unfortunately this schooling 
never addressed the matter of turnover calculations.  
 
                                                        
62 Engels to Lafargue, MECW, v. 46, #256, April 25, 1883. Notably, when Engels learned out about 
the five-hundred page manuscript, he was not aware of its condition (Ibid.).   
63 After 1868, Marx did not write Engels again about turnover calculations.   
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Conclusion 
The traces of the business origins of Marxism faded quickly. A few years after 
Engels’s retirement the firm Ermen & Engels disappeared. Engels agreed with 
Godfrey in 1870 that the firm continue to use his family name for five more years, 
a privilege that under English law exposed him to personal liability. After that 
time Engels gleefully withdrew his name and the firm was renamed as Ermen & 
Roby. Curiously in 1896, within a year of Engels’ death, the firm was 
incorporated with a capital of 134 thousand pounds and a year later was 
amalgamated with thirteen other firms to form the English Sewing Cotton 
Company (Henderson 1971). The cotton industry as a family affair died with 
Engels. The business career of Engels has remained interesting only as an 
explanation for his wealth and not as a significant fact about his personality, 
skills and knowledge. Engels bears responsibility for this obfuscation. He never 
hid his bourgeois origins but always treated these with contempt, and that 
sentiment contaminated his understanding of his partnership with Marx. Engels 
wrote that  
I cannot deny that both before and during my forty years’ collaboration 
with Marx I had a certain independent share in laying the foundations of 
the theory, and more particularly in its elaboration. But the greater part 
of its leading basic principles, especially in the realm of economics and 
history, and above all their final trenchant formulation, belong to Marx. 
What I contributed—at any rate with the exception of my work in a few 
special fields—Marx could very well have done without me. What Marx 
accomplished I would not have achieved. Marx stood higher, saw further, 
and took a wider and quicker view than all the rest of us. Marx was a 
genius; we others were at best talented (Engels 1886[2009], footnote, pp. 
41-42).  
 
The followers of Marx and Engels sanctioned this modest assessment conceiving 
Engels as a proselytizer or elaborator. 
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Our contention that Marx owed much to Engels is however not wholly 
novel. Gareth Steadman-Jones’s writing in 1977 claimed Engels as “co-founder 
and elaborator of historical materialism“ (p. 77). in a plea to devote closer 
consideration to the insights contained in Engels’ Outline and Condition. But no 
one has yet sought to extend the credit and influence beyond the 1850s and into 
the Manchester exile. The difficulty, as we have shown, is that those years can be 
gleaned only in fragments, with Engels purposively drawing a curtain between 
his business and private life and seeking to preserve only the memory of his 
radical endeavors.  
As we have shown, Capital would have been incomplete without Engels’s 
epistolary insights. His position at Ermen & Engels allowed him to supply Marx 
with critical information that Marx could not have obtained elsewhere. Ermen 
and Engels’ business depended upon sound use of machinery valuations and the 
accumulation fund. 
To further detect Engels’s imprint on Capital one should also appreciate 
Engels’s more subtle contribution. In numerous newsy paragraphs that intruded 
on the correspondence about family or European political intrigue, Engels kept 
Marx abreast of the sentiment of markets, giving him greater access to the views 
and reactions of capitalists than Marx might glean from reading the Manchester 
Guardian or The Economist.  
It was by Engels’ hand that Marx came to see capitalism as engaging a 
global market and threatened by crises of overproduction. They saw this 
conception confirmed by the slump of 1857 and the “cotton famine” of a few 
years later. The anatomy of sudden mass bankruptcy and short time, and also of 
recovery and prosperity, made the industrial cycle into a fundamental puzzle for 
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Marx work. And the key to deciphering it was not to be found in the theory of 
value but in the dynamics of accumulation. As Marx explained to Engels, “there is 
a wide divergence in political economy between what is of practical interest and 
what is theoretically necessary, so that one cannot even find the necessary 
material.”64 It was in that context that Marx called upon Engels’s business 
experience to grasp the practices of machinery valuation and investment. 
Indubitably, the relationship between Marx and Engels was unique. 
Singular both for the personalities and life stories of the pair, as for their lasting, 
world changing, influence. But their partnership is also conventional in many 
ways. It is cut through by banal family feuds and loyalties and by financial and 
health worries. It is bond by mid-century cultures of writing and reporting on 
business, with ideas, clippings of newspapers, and broker circulars moving at 
impressive regularity through Britain’s postal system. And finally, Marx and 
Engel’s intellectual partnership speaks anew to the well known struggle to 
abstract the experience of lived business into a political economy.    
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